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Abstract 
The German corporate governance code includes a recommendation as to 
diversity on corporate boards. Two draft bills on gender quotas are currently 
under way in legislative proceedings. However, the ruling coalition rejects those, 
advocating a “flexible quota”. Corporate law academic scholarship disapproves 
of gender quotas. This goes back to disapproval of the underlying policy and the 
fear of adverse consequences on corporate decision-making as well as the claim 
of incompatibility with European law and with German constitutional law.   
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Legal aspects of gender balance on corporate boards in Germany 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
This note has been requested by the European Parliament’s Policy Department C 
“Constitutional Affairs and Citizens’ Rights”. 
The underrepresentation of women on corporate boards has been a concern for legislators 
both at member states and at EU level. While there is widespread agreement as to the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  s e e i n g  m o r e  f e m a l e  d i r e c t ors – for reasons as diverse as enhancing 
shareholder value, reducing groupthink phenomena or improving social justice – no such 
agreement has been reached on the suitability of legislative measures. Suggestions on this 
issue range from legislative abstinence, over variations of “soft measures” to the 
introduction of “hard” gender quotas. 
Germany has been seeing a lively political debate on this topic for two years. The Christian-
democratic government opposes “fix” quotas. Instead, it has been promoting a law obliging 
corporations to set their own “flexible” quota. However, no legislative procedure has yet 
been initiated by the government. The social-democratic party has introduced one far-
reaching legislative proposal. Lately, it joined forces with the green party in order to bring 
about a much milder proposal including however “fix” quotas. 
Aim 
The aim of the present study is to provide an overview on legislative proposals currently 
presented and on academic scholarship on the issue. Taking it from there, legal obstacles 
to the introduction of a “fix” quota under German law are discussed and the “soft” version 
of “flexible” quotas is being advocated. 
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Policy Department C - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
1.  TERMINOLOGY AND LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES 

KEY FINDINGS 
  For the purposes of this note, a gender “quota” is a figure detailing the proportion 
between men and women on a corporate board. 
  Introducing legal rules on gender quotas requires carefully distinguishing the rule’s 
elements of application from its sanctions. 
  As to elements of application, a legislator introducing gender quotas will have to 
decide upon (i) which type of corporation and (ii) which type of board is to be 
addressed as well as (iii) who sets the quota and (iv) to what extent exceptions 
from the rule will be granted. 
  As to sanctions, any legislation on gender quotas requires a decision upon 
transparency requirements and/or nullity or revocability of boards which do not 
comply with the quota requirement. The latter choice triggers a number of complex 
questions of corporate law. Further sanctions for boards violating a quota rule 
include fines, negative impact on pay or ineligibility for state bidding procedures. 
Discussing gender quotas requires using precise terminology as well as a number of careful 
distinctions when comparing rules in different Member States or deciding upon legislative 
steps to take.  
1.1.  Terminology: the gender “quota” 
For the purposes of this note, the term gender “quota” will be understood quite broadly to 
encompass any figure detailing the proportion between men and women on a corporate 
board. It is worth noting that gender quotas do not necessarily need a fix number (i. e. 
40%) or even a parameter set by the legislator (rather than by the corporation itself). 
Hence, I will speak of a country’s law including a gender quota, whenever there are legal 
rules in place which require the competent body voting on the board’s composition to 
specifically decide upon the number of women who should sit on that board. In the case of 
Germany, the competent body is the supervisory board when appointing the members of 
the management board (Vorstand). The shareholders general meeting is the competent 
body when voting for the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). 
1.2.  The elements of application 
When we analyse legal rules it is helpful to distinguish the elements of applying the rule 
from the sanctions for not conforming to the rule. A rule on gender quotas will need to 
address a minimum of four elements of application (all of which are the object of debate in 
Germany). 
 Taking into account the wide variety of business associations in Germany, ranging 
from private partnerships (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts) over commercial 
partnerships with full personal liability of at least one of the members (offene 
27
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
   
     
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 


Legal aspects of gender balance on corporate boards in Germany 
Handelsgesellschaft/Kommanditgesellschaft) to companies with limited liability 
(Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) and stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaft) a 
choice of the type of corporation addressed is required. Obliging a private partnership 
to decide upon a gender quota might be seen as a more drastic intervention in private 
law matters than requiring the same from a public stock corporation. 
 Whenever a corporation has more than one type of board (dualistic system), a choice 
of the type of board addressed by a rule on gender quotas is required. It is a regular 
feature of companies with limited liability to separate owners (shareholders) from 
management. Managerial tasks may be executed by one board (monistic system) 
alternatively its tasks may be divided between a management and a supervisory 
board (dualistic system). German law allows for the dualistic system exclusively as far 
as stock corporations are concerned. While there is some feeble support for gender 
quotas as far as supervisory boards are concerned, both public opinion and academics 
seem to find it much harder to include management boards. Under German law, 
employee representatives are members of supervisory boards. Hence, the problem if 
and how employee representatives would need to be considered for a gender quota 
adds to complexity. 
 We have mentioned earlier that it is not necessarily the legislator who sets a quota. 
While countries such as France and Norway have enacted laws featuring a legal 
quota, the choice of who sets a quota is still quite open in Germany. The social-
democratic and the green party advocate a legislative quota, the governing Christian-
democratic party opts for each corporation to individually set the quota (see below 
2.1.). 
 Granting exceptions to a legal rule is often required in order to avoid undue 
consequences. Of course, the choice of exceptions to the rule is an important one. 
The more numerous the occasions which allow to disregard the rule, the less 
substance remains. 
1.3.  The sanctions 
The efficiency of a legal rule to a large extent depends on the sanctions associated with it. 
As to gender quotas there are a number of general and some rather company-law specific 
sanctions. More general sanctions, as seen e. g. in France or Spain, include fines for boards 
not in conformity with a legal quota, negative impact on board member’s pay or ineligibility 
for state bidding procedures. The German debate has focused on sanctions which more 
directly bear on company law. 
 An obvious sanction for non-compliance with a gender quota is transparency. A 
transparency rule could require corporations to annually issue a statement on the 
gender quota of their boards. The policy underlying transparency rules of this type 
will be that non-compliance leads to reputational damage hence will be avoided. 
 Significantly harsher are sanctions which entail implications for the proper 
composition of a board which is not in compliance with a quota. There are quite a 
number of possible strategies for a sanction of this type. All of them pose tricky 
questions under German law as far as supervisory board members are concerned. 
Those are not appointed, but elected by the shareholders. Hence, an election not in 
accordance with a quota would have to be nullified, should the legislator opt for 
implications for the proper composition of a board. 
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Policy Department C - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
 The law may altogether prevent a board not in compliance with a quota. The election 
(in the case of a shareholder vote on the board) or the appointment (in the case of 
the supervisory board appointing the management board) of such a board would be 
void or revocable. If a board composed in this non-compliant fashion nonetheless 
goes about its business, a number of complex questions of company law arise: Can 
actions of the non-compliant board bind the corporation? If not, will legitimate 
expectations of creditors be honoured? Will the body voting for/appointing the 
“wrong” board be liable for damages? 
 Instead of declaring a non-compliant board null and void altogether, the legislator 
may opt for limiting the consequences to some of its members. Imagine a German 
supervisory board comprising 20 people, all male. Imagine further, German law 
introduced a legal gender quota of 25% on 1st January 2014, i. e. then requires 5 
female members. The A-Corporation will hold elections of its supervisory board on 
10th January 2014. Under German law, the supervisory board is not constituted in its 
entirety each year. Instead, each member of the supervisory board is typically elected 
for a bit less than five years. Members leaving the board earlier will make place for 
new members.1 Consequently, when the board in our example will be elected on 10th 
January 2014, there won’t be 20 seats to fill, but less. If 5 seats will need to be filled 
on that day, there is a straightforward answer: We need 5 women. What happens if 
only 0 to 4 seats are empty?2 Even if more than 5 seats will need to be filled, the 
answer is tricky: German law offers two ways of electing supervisory board members. 
Option (1) is the election “en bloc”. A list is proposed to the shareholders, comprising 
the entirety of new members and the shareholders vote for the entire list. Let’s 
assume in our example there are 7 new members on the list, but only 4 of them are 
women – will the entire election be void? Option (2) for electing supervisory board 
members is to individually vote for each member. Let us again assume there are 7 
new members to be elected on 10th January 2014. We said 5 of those will need to be 
female. What happens if the shareholders assembly votes for candidates 1-2 
(female), 3-5 (male), 6 (female), 7 (male)? Will the election of all male candidates be 
void or should only two elections be void? If the latter is the case, which ones of the 
male candidates need to go? Will all elections be void, since there are too few 
women? 
1 Section 102 German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), cf. Langenbucher (2011a) § 5 recital 42. 
2 The answer obviously is: the legislator will need to provide for transitional arrangements. 
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Legal aspects of gender balance on corporate boards in Germany 
2.  LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN GERMANY 

KEY FINDINGS 
  There is no legal quota for supervisory or management boards under German law.  
  The German corporate governance code recommends “diversity” when appointing 
management board members and electing supervisory board members. 
  The German government currently favours the family ministry’s “flexi-quota” 
proposal. This proposal requires corporations to set their own quota, flexibly 
adjusted to their needs.  
  The Social-democratic party has introduced an ambitious draft bill. The Social-
democratic and the green party have jointly introduced another, less ambitious draft 
bill, hoping for a compromise and a quick legislative procedure.  
The German government has seen extensive debate between the minister of labour (Ursula 
von der Leyen) and the minister of family (Kristina Schröder), the former opting for a fix 
quota of 30%, the latter advocating a flexible quota to be introduced by the corporation 
itself (the so-called “flexi-quota”). Chancellor Merkel has backed the “flexi-quota” plan 
which includes a number of preliminary stages, leading up to legislative action at a later 
time only. The liberal-democratic party (coalition partner of the Christian-democratic party) 
opposes any quota.  
Figure 1: Women in supervisory and management boards in Germany 
Source: Author and www.flexi-quote.de 
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Policy Department C - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
2.1.  The German corporate governance code 
The German corporate governance code sets out standards of good corporate governance. 
Listed stock corporations are required to report on their application of the code under a 
“comply-or-explain” structure provided for in section 161 German stock corporation act. 
The code comprises (1) rules which are binding under the German stock corporation act, 
(2) recommendations which corporations may deviate from when providing an explanation 
why they do and (3) mere suggestions which may be disregarded without reporting. 
4.1.2 of the code recommends for the management board to have due regard for the 
benefits of diversity, notably gender, when hiring executive staff. 5.1.2 of the code 
recommends the same for the supervisory board when appointing the members of the 
management board. 5.4.1 of the code recommends for the supervisory board to specify 
policies for its own composition including diversity. Special emphasis is placed on 
understanding the broader concept of “diversity” as focussed on gender. 
The legal sanctions for not reporting on the application of the code at all or for falsely 
claiming to apply the code are a subject of hot debate under German law.
1 Most authors 
agree that management and supervisory board members are liable for damages, yet losses 
which can be claimed are rare. In some cases, the false report may rule out formal 
approval of the board’s conduct by the shareholder’s assembly. Obviously, there are no 
sanctions for paying lip service only to the code provisions recommending diversity. 
2.2.  The “flexi-quota” proposal 
The ministry of family has been advocating a law introducing a “flexi-quota”.
2 According to 
the minister’s internet site www.flexi-quote.de, corporations will be required to individually 
set a gender quota. They will have to report on the quota chosen as well as on the point in 
time when the board plans to fully comply with the quota. Proponents of the flexi-quota 
point to the competitive advantage of catering to differences in female talent pools across 
industry sectors. 
As to elements of application, the proposed quota covers companies which are listed and 
fall under the scope of mandatory employee representation. It applies to both, 
management and supervisory board. 
With regard to sanctions, the proposal remains vague. The minimum sanction of 
transparency, i. e. reporting on the quota and its implementation, is a necessary 
component of the flexi-quota’s logic. The minister seems to hope that publicity and the fear 
of reputational damage will do most of the trick. Nevertheless, the proposal stipulates that 
both, failure to set a quota and non-compliance with the quota will be sanctioned, without 
specifying what type of sanction is being envisaged.
3 
1 Cf. Langenbucher (2011a) § 4 recital 112 et seq. with accompanying footnotes. 
2 Cf Langenbucher (2011b) summarizing an expertise on preliminary plans for a „flexi-quota“. 
3 http://www.flexi-quote.de/faq-zur-flexi-quote.html 
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Legal aspects of gender balance on corporate boards in Germany 
2.3.  The draft bill introduced by the social democratic party  
A number of draft bills have been discussed in parliament,
1 official hearings in January 
2013 were held on two drafts, one of which introduced by the social democratic party,
2  the 
other one put forward jointly by that party and the green party. 
The social-democratic party’s draft bill addresses listed stock corporations as well as 
companies which fall under the German law of mandatory employee representation. The 
social democratic party’s draft bill encompasses supervisory boards as well as management 
boards. As far as supervisory boards are concerned, both, board members elected by the 
shareholders as well as employee representatives, fall under the proposed rule’s scope. 
The law is to come into force immediately and require corporations to implement a quota of 
30% as regards supervisory boards and 20% for management boards. Two years later, the 
quota is raised to 40% for both boards. There are no exceptions to the rule provided for. 
The draft bill aims at company law specific sanctions when stipulating that an appointment 
of members of the management board and an election of members of the supervisory 
board “will only be possible” if in compliance with the quota. Appointments/elections not 
complying with the quota are to be regarded as legally void. Hence, the members 
appointed/elected are not members of a board in breach of the law. Instead, they do not 
become board members at all. It follows that actions of the management board are, with 
minor variations according to the corporation’s bylaws, void and cannot legally bind the 
corporation. The draft bill does not provide for specific remedies for third parties. As long as 
a compliant board has not been appointed, one will have to resort to the stock corporation 
act’s court procedure which allows a court to appoint suitable candidates in situations 
where the minimum number of legally required board members is not reached. 
The drafters of the bill are not too worried by the threat of the corporation not being able to 
act in a legally binding fashion. They point to the fact that very often actions of the 
supervisory board may still be legally valid if a sufficient number of members take part in 
the decision. This goes back to section 108 of the German stock corporation act which 
stipulates that a supervisory board’s quorum may be defined in the corporation’s bylaws. 
Should there be no relevant provision in the bylaws, the stock corporation act stipulates a 
quorum of a minimum of one half of its members being present. Let us assume a quota of 
30% is introduced. The B-corporation’s shareholder’s general meeting votes for men only. 
Let us further assume a sufficient number of vacancies could have been filled in order to 
meet the quota requirement. The election of the “wrong” candidates is legally void (we will 
leave aside the complexities of figuring out who is the wrong candidate out of a number of 
candidates). The supervisory board may still have a quorum since 70% of its members are 
proper members and section 108 requires a quorum of 50% only. However, according to 
the draft bill a supervisory board may be non-compliant for a maximum of one year. After 
lapse of 12 months, the draft bill stipulates that the supervisory board loses its capacity to 
act in a legally binding fashion. 
1 Draft bill by the green party of 20.10.2010, available at Bundestags-Drucksache 17/3296; draft bill by the Land 
of Nordrhein-Westfalen of 25.11.2011, available at Bundesrats-Drucksache 87/11; draft bill by the social-
democratic party of 6.3.2012 available at Bundestags-Drucksache 17/8878; draft bill by the town Hamburg of 
29.5.2012, available at Bundesrats-Drucksache 330/12. 
2 Bundestags-Drucksache 17/8878. 
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Policy Department C - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
2.4.	  The draft bill jointly introduced by the social democratic 
party and the green party 
The most recent bill was jointly introduced by the social democratic party and the green 
party in October of 2012.
1 It advocates a significantly milder compromise, hoping to quickly 
introduce the bill. This rush is to be read against the background of 2013 being a so-called 
“super-election-year” for supervisory boards. Looking at corporations listed under the DAX 
30 index alone, 77 open posts will need to be filled. 
The draft bill’s scope encompasses listed stock corporations or corporations which fall under 
the German law of mandatory employee representation. It applies to supervisory boards 
only and covers the entirety of the board members.  
The quota introduced is to come into effect on 1
st January 2018. It is set at 20%, only on 
1
st January 2023 it is to be raised to 40%. Granting the considerable transition period of 
five years for the 20% quota to apply and another five years for it to reach 40%, accounts 
for perceived difficulties in finding suitable candidates. 
The bill includes a mechanism in order not to compromise small boards where finding 
candidates may prove tricky: Boards with three to six members satisfy the quota when 
electing one candidate of the underrepresented gender. Boards with seven or eight 
members fulfil the quota when comprising two such candidates; the quota of 20% applies 
only for boards comprising nine or more members. After 2023, requirements are to tighten. 
Boards with two to four members need one candidate of the underrepresented gender, 
boards with five to six members need two such members. Boards with seven or eight 
members need three “minority” members. 
The proposed law stipulates a seemingly broad exception to the rule. Whenever the 
corporation shows that “in spite of considerable efforts” no suitable candidates could be 
found, the rule doesn’t apply. In the bill’s annotations, this rule appears to lose some of its 
vagueness. It is to be “interpreted very narrowly” and the drafters assess the probability of 
not finding suitable candidates as “extremely low”. A federal agency is to decide upon 
acceptance of the reasons put forward by the corporation. 
Sanctions are quite mild. A federal agency is to testify compliance of a corporation with the 
legal rule and annually publish statistics, including a “naming-and-shaming”-mechanism. 
The corporation is required to annually report on the composition of their supervisory board 
and on compliance with the legal quota. Disregarding the reporting requirement entails the 
possibility of a fine. The corporation loses tax privileges for remuneration paid to the 
entirety of a non-compliant board, if the shareholders representatives’ side of the board is 
not in compliance with the quota requirement. 
The draft bill proposes no further sanctions regarding the specifics of company law, thus 
avoiding the complex topics raised earlier (see above 1.3). Instead, the draft bill expressly 
stipulates that legal validity of a board’s actions is not hindered by that board disregarding 
the legal quota. Similarly, the draft bill does not allow for challenging the shareholder’s 
assembly’s election of a board on the grounds that it violates the legal quota. 
1 Bundestags-Drucksache 17/11139, 23.10.2012. 
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Legal aspects of gender balance on corporate boards in Germany 
3.  ACADEMIC SCHOLARSHIP 

KEY FINDINGS 
  A vast majority of academic scholarship is opposed to an introduction of gender 
quotas in corporate boards.  
  Arguments against gender quotas mainly stem from (i) opposition to the underlying 
policy, (ii) concerns about the incompatibility with constitutional or European law 
and (iii) pragmatic worries about adverse consequences on corporate decision-
making. 
The introduction of a gender quota in corporate boards, it seems, is disapproved not only 
by public opinion in Germany but also by a majority of the legal community in general and 
corporate law academics more specifically. 
According to a recent survey, a minority of 30% of the German population regards the 
underrepresentation of women in “leading positions” as “unjust”.
1 The answer to the 
question “should a gender quota promote equal opportunities?” left even less room for 
doubt: 
Figure 2: “Should a gender quota promote equal opportunities?” 
total population 
yes 
18 
no 
82 
25 
75 
female population 
yes 
no 
Source: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (2013) 
The “Deutscher Juristentag” (Association of German Jurists) on its latest forum in 
September 2012 just as clearly voiced opposition against introducing legal quotas.
2 While 
71 out of 79 voters appreciate the corporate governance code’s efforts to promote 
diversity, 58 out of 76 voters oppose a legislative quota for management boards and 62 out 
of 80 voters oppose a legislative quota for supervisory boards. 54 out of 80 voters oppose 
the “flexi-quota” advocated by the ministry for family. 
1 Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (2013) p. 27. 
2 http://www.djt.de/fileadmin/downloads/69/121206_djt_69_beschluesse_web_rz.pdf 
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Policy Department C - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
3.1.  The policies underlying a gender quota 
Enhancing efficiency and shareholder value is often cited as the guiding policy underlying 
the introduction of gender quotas in business corporations. Most German academics do not 
subscribe to this view. If anything, they see gender quotas as a means to further fairness 
and social justice, loosely connected to discussions on corporate social responsibility.
1 This 
has important implications for justifying legal action. While enhancing shareholder value 
provides a good reason for reforming corporate law, it is certainly much more complicated 
to introduce corporate law rules because of fairness concerns of social justice. 
3.2.  Incompatibility with European law  
Most legal scholars view the introduction of a specific form of gender quota, namely a strict 
and not performed-based quota, as violating art. 8 TFEU’s guarantee of equality between 
men and women as well as art. 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and art. 2 para. e subpara. 1, 4 of the equal treatment directive 2006/54/EC.2 
Scholars point to the ECJ’s decisions in Kalanke, Badeck and Marshall, where the court 
opposed legal rules requiring automatic promotion of women irrespective of performance-
based criteria. It is claimed that the introduction of a gender quota for boards falls into the 
category of strict, not performance based quotas. This argument refers to fix quotas (e.g. 
40%) which need to be fulfilled even if we assume a case where it was undisputed that the 
available female candidates are less qualified than their male competitors. Hence, any 
quota to be introduced will need to take into account the court’s jurisprudence on this form 
of “reverse discrimination”. In the past, the ECJ accepted quotas including the requirement 
of female candidates being as qualified as male candidates (merit-based appointment) as 
well as a rule granting exceptions for certain cases of impossibility of finding a female 
candidate. It might be noted, however, that the ECJ’s jurisprudence so far concerns cases 
of employment. Few scholars have discussed to what extent this line of reasoning can be 
applied to the membership of a board which seems to display quite a number of features 
distinguishing it from employment situations.
3 
3.3.  Incompatibility with German constitutional law 
An overwhelming majority of German corporate law scholars oppose gender quotas for 
constitutional reasons. Interestingly, there is much less opposition from constitutional law 
scholars on that same point. There are two main lines of reasoning for this opposition. The 
first one refers to the concerns of reverse discrimination we have just outlined with equal 
protection of men and women granted by Art. 3 of the German constitution. The second 
line of reasoning is concerned with Art. 14’s protection of property rights. 
According to Art. 14 of the German constitution shareholders are protected as owners of 
the corporation. Any rule limiting their rights flowing from this property position fall under 
scrutiny by the Constitutional Court. The right to elect the board, it is argued, constitutes a 
prime shareholder right. Hence, a rule limiting the shareholder’s freedom to choose 
whoever they consider fit possibly violates the constitution. Of course, there are a number 
1 Fleischer (2012; Habersack (2012) p. 26; more openness towards gender concerns: Bayer (2013) p. 7;
 
Möllers/Hailer (2012) p. 844, 847 et seq.
 
2 Bachmann (2011a) p. 1131.
 
3 Bachmann (2011a) p. 1135 ; Langenbucher (2012) p. 322;
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Legal aspects of gender balance on corporate boards in Germany 
of legal rules which sensibly limit this freedom – rules requiring the required mental 
capacity, a minimum age or the absence of criminal offences provide good examples. 
Where do we draw the line? The German Constitutional Court acknowledges the high 
complexity of property rights being defined by the legislator ("what counts as a property 
right?”) and that same legislator being bound by the constitution’s guarantee of property 
(“does a law redefining a property right violate the constitution?”). The test it applies is a 
proportionality test. Firstly, the law’s policy will be scrutinized: is the goal the legislator 
aims at when introducing the law a proper one? As to gender quotas, the legislator may 
point to both, enhancing shareholder value as well as fairness concerns of equality between 
men and women. Secondly, the legal instrument chosen will be tested against 
constitutional principles. The rule chosen by the legislator will need to qualify as apt, 
necessary and proportionate.  
The Constitutional Court’s most important precedent concerns the establishment of co­
determination on corporate boards in the 70s.
1 The Constitutional Court accepted co­
determination, pointing to the large discretion the legislator enjoys as well as the 
proportionality test being met. One argument in favour of the constitutionality of this rule 
was the fact that board members elected by the shareholders are granted the deciding 
vote. Consequently, whenever the “owner’s side” of a board votes unanimously, the 
“employee side” cannot overturn that vote. 
Some corporate law scholars argue that (i) the legislator’s policy cannot be described as 
enhancing shareholder value but solely as promoting social justice and (ii) a rule promoting 
social justice may never justify reforming corporate law.
2 Others point to a “cumulation 
effect”:
3 The shareholder’s freedom to elect their preferred candidate is limited not only by 
co-determination but also by EU law requiring a financial expert. Piling a gender quota on 
top of those restrictions, it is argued, would violate the constitution’s guarantee of property 
rights. 
It seems that the majority of constitutional law scholars do not share their corporate law 
colleague’s skepticism.
4 They point to the German constitutional court’s decision upholding 
co-determination and claim that a gender quota might well pass the proportionality test – 
provided that the rule accounts for fears of reverse discrimination. 
3.4.  Lack of competence for the European legislator 
Adding to constitutional concerns, most German corporate law scholars claim that there is 
no competence for the European legislator to pass a directive introducing gender quotas.
5 
This is based on general views on subsidiarity as well as on the more specific denial that 
art. 157 para. 3 TFEU or art. 50 para. 2 lit. g TFEU allow for a directive of this type. The 
latter requires a “safeguard […] for the protection of the interests of members and others”. 
Gender quotas are viewed as a fairness measure of social justice, not providing 
competence for the European legislator to pass a company law directive. The former - 
picked by the Commission – applies to employment situations exclusively. It is doubtful 
1 BVerfGE 50, 290.
 
2 Hoffmann-Becking (2011) p. 1173.
 
3 Habersack (2012) p. 29 et seq. ; Hirte (2011) p. 524 et seq.
 
4 Papier/Heidebach (2011) p. 324.
 
5 Bachmann (2011a) p. 1135  ; Bachmann (2011b) p. 1304; Basedow (2013)  Fleischer (2012) p. 164; Koch 

(2011) p. 833.
 
36   
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
   
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Policy Department C - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
whether board members, even more so if supervisory board members are concerned, may 
be regarded as “employees” in that sense.
1 
3.5.  Adverse consequences on corporate business 
While most corporate law scholars acknowledge the desirability of more female leadership 
in principle, they blame traditional role expectations, unwillingness of women to sacrifice 
family life to career concerns and insufficient childcare.
2 Against this background, rules on 
gender quotas in corporate boards are viewed as taking private companies hostage for a 
goal which is if not exclusively, at least primarily a concern of social fairness and fairness.
3 
Especially as regards management board seats, the generally accepted view seems to be 
that there are currently not enough qualified women available.
4 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARK  
It might have become apparent that the introduction of fixed quotas, even in the watered-
down version introduced by the social-democratic and the green party, meets considerable 
opposition in Germany. This is true for corporate law scholars as well as for public opinion. 
Against this background, flexible quotas seem a promising solution to accommodate both, 
concerns about shareholder’s rights and policies of enhancing gender balance on corporate 
boards.
5 I have advocated elsewhere the broader concept of a “declaration of strategy”.
6 It 
would require corporations to report on their strategy for board composition, on their 
current status quo and on the time-line they set for achieving their reported “ideal” board 
composition. Such declaration is not limited to gender but might include independence, 
professional qualification and the like. 
Considering reputational effects of a declaration of this type, one might assume that as to 
sanctions, disclosure should suffice and eliminate the need for the more drastic measures 
of annihilating elections/appointments of corporate board members.  
1 Basedow (2013) p. 42.
 
2 Habersack (2012) p. 28.
 
3 Habersack (2012) p. 28; Hopt (2012) p. 619.
 
4 Habersack (2012) p. 34.
 
5 Advocating « flexible quotas » for supervisory boards Bayer (2013) p. 9.
 
6 Langenbucher (2012) p. 26 et seq.
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